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OPINION* 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Defendants-appellants Canon McMillan School District, Dr. Nick Bayat, Michele 
Moeller, and Linda Nichols appeal from a District Court order enforcing an arbitration 
agreement entered into by defendants and plaintiff Cayla Kubiak.  The dispute centers on 
a purported “high-low” provision that Kubiak claims but defendants deny was included in 
the arbitration agreement.  Inasmuch as the parties tentatively agreed at a case 
management conference in the District Court to submit the dispute between them to 
arbitration, the Court prepared, though it did not file, an order dated May 7, 2014, for that   
___________________ 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
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purpose.  Subsequently the parties exchanged correspondence indicating that they would 
agree on the parameters of a high-low provision for the arbitration at a mediation session 
to be held on June 12, 2014, prior to the arbitration.  Yet there is no suggestion in the 
record that the parties ever executed an agreement setting forth the parameters of a high-
low agreement.  The mediation was conducted but was not successful as the parties did 
not settle the case at that session.   
The case proceeded to arbitration after the mediation failed.  The parties moved 
for summary judgment in the arbitration proceedings and the arbitrator found in 
defendants’ favor on liability in a written opinion dated June 5, 2016.  The arbitrator 
therefore did not make a monetary or other award to Kubiak.  Kubiak then filed a motion 
in the District Court to enforce the arbitration agreement which she contended included a 
high-low provision.  She argued that she was entitled to $50,000, the “low” amount in the 
high-low agreement to which she claims that the parties had agreed at the mediation 
proceedings.  The District Court granted her motion by order dated July 5, 2016, as it 
held that the parties had agreed on a $1 million/$50,000 high-low provision and that 
Kubiak therefore was entitled to the $50,000.  Defendants appeal as they claim that the 
parties never entered into an enforceable high-low agreement and the Court erred in 
requiring them to pay $50,000 to Kubiak in the face of the arbitrator’s determination that 
they were not liable to her. 
 For the reasons that follow, we will reverse the District Court’s July 5, 2016 order 
and will remand the case to that Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing following which 
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the Court should determine whether the parties entered into an enforceable high-low 
agreement with specific parameters at the mediation session and, if they did, whether 
Kubiak is entitled to recover the low amount even though the arbitrator found in 
defendants’ favor on the liability issue. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Kubiak initiated this action in a state court but defendants removed the case to the 
District Court.  In her complaint, Kubiak alleged that she was entitled to damages 
because she was the victim of an act of sexual contact while a student at the Canon 
McMillan Middle School.1  At the District Court case management conference on April 
28, 2014, the parties discussed the possibility of referring the case to binding arbitration 
for resolution.  Consequently, the Court prepared the draft preliminary order to which we 
have made reference sending the case to arbitration.   
In their negotiations prior to the mediation session the parties discussed the 
possibility of entering into a “high-low” agreement confining the scope of any arbitration 
award to an amount between the outside limits on which the parties would agree.  See 
                                              
1 We have no need to describe the details of Kubiak’s claim.  We note that originally 
there was an additional defendant but he was dismissed from the case before the case was 
removed to the District Court.  Though the name of the school district suggests that it 
may be an ecclesiastical institution, in her complaint Kubiak pleaded that Canon 
McMillan School District is “a political subdivision” in Pennsylvania and the Canon 
McMillan Middle School is “a public educational institution.” 
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app’x at 22-26.2  On May 14, 2014, defendant’s attorney sent an email to Kubiak’s 
attorney informing him that the $1 million high damages amount identified as Kubiak’s 
demand in her initial disclosures was a “non-starter for the District.”  Id. at 22.  The email 
then recited that the “School District cannot agree to binding arbitration unless the 
damages phase of the arbitration is done as a high/low award and the high/low range can 
be agreed upon at the mediation.”  Id.    
 Defendants’ counsel next proposed updating the language of the previously 
drafted May 7, 2014 preliminary order referring the case to arbitration by adding a 
provision reciting that there would be a high-low agreement but without including its 
parameters.  Id. at 23.  The parties through counsel stipulated to the order which they 
submitted to the District Court.  The Court subsequently submitted the case to binding 
arbitration by an order dated May 16, 2014, which supplemented its May 7, 2014 order 
with the following provision: 
The parties agree that the case will be submitted to the arbitrator as a high-
low arbitration and the details of the high-low maximum and minimum 
amounts will be discussed and agreed upon at the June 12, 2014 mediation . 
 .  .  .  The parties further agree that the [d]efendants retain the right to 
contest liability at the arbitration. 
 
Id. at 29-30.  In what has proven to be a crucial aspect of this case, the May 16, 2014 
order did not specify the high-low parameters.   
 The parties engaged in the mediation on June 12, 2014, but they did not agree on a 
                                              
2  Kubiak objects to the inclusion of the parties’ communications such as their emails as 
part of the appellate record.  See appellee’s br. at 13.  But, as defendants note, the parties’ 
communications were exhibits appended to the motion papers in the District Court and 
therefore are part of the record on appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). 
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settlement of the case or provide for the preparation of a document setting forth high-low 
parameters.  Nevertheless, Kubiak claims that they reached an agreement on the high-low 
parameters at the mediation.  Defendants have a different view of what happened at the 
mediation.  They claim that during the mediation, Kubiak’s counsel proposed several 
settlement amounts, but never proposed a settlement figure of $1 million.  On the other 
hand they assert that they offered to settle the case for $50,000, but that Kubiak rejected 
the offer.  Appellants’ br. at 11.  Defendants also assert that the parties did not agree on 
the parameters of a high-low agreement so that the parties decided to submit the case to 
the arbitrator without high-low parameters.  Id. at 11-12.  Defendants further claim that 
the parties agreed that the arbitrator would have to find defendants liable before the 
arbitrator could award any damages against them to Kubiak.  Id. at 12.  Kubiak rejects 
this assertion and, as we have indicated, contends that the parties agreed to a high-low 
agreement with specified parameters so that even if there was a finding on liability 
against her, she would be entitled to $50,000.  Defendants maintain that “[b]ecause the 
case was administratively closed, it did not occur to anyone, including . . . the mediator 
and counsel for the parties, that they would need to return to [the District Court] to 
request permission to proceed without a high-low.”  Id. 
 Following the unsuccessful mediation, the parties communicated with the 
arbitrator prior to the arbitration date because the arbitration had not been canceled.  In 
particular, defense counsel sent a letter to the arbitrator on June 20, 2014, with a copy to 
Kubiak’s counsel, indicating that the mediation had failed and that the parties were 
proceeding toward arbitration.  See app’x at 33-34.  Defense counsel included the 
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following provision in the June 20, 2014 letter: 
We have now agreed that the case will not be submitted as a high-low since 
the parties were significantly far apart in their settlement positions at the 
close of the mediation.  Instead, the case is to be submitted to you without a 
high-low parameter, and [d]efendants have retained the right to contest 
liability.  In addition, both parties have agreed that each may file a Motion 
for Summary Judgment if deemed necessary. 
 
Id. at 33.  Defendants claim that Kubiak’s counsel did not reject defendants’ version of 
the parties’ positions with respect to the high-low agreement after defendants’ counsel 
sent the June 20, 2014 letter to the arbitrator.  Moreover, defendants contend that the 
parties did not discuss reaching a high-low agreement after their counsel sent the June 20, 
2014 letter.  Appellants’ br. at 14.  Defendants apparently want us to draw an inference 
from this contention that the parties had abandoned the possibility of reaching a high-low 
agreement. 
The arbitration then was conducted.  In the proceedings the parties moved for 
summary judgment and on June 5, 2016, the arbitrator found in favor of defendants 
because he concluded that they were not liable on any of Kubiak’s claims.  App’x at 41-
51.  On June 14, 2016, after Kubiak requested that the arbitrator clarify his decision, he 
explained that he had granted summary judgment to defendants on all of Kubiak’s claims, 
including those against defendants sued in their individual capacities.  Id. at 59-60.  The 
arbitrator’s decision did not mention any high-low parameters or indicate that Kubiak 
was entitled to a damages award despite the negative liability finding that he had made.  
Id. at 41-51, 59-60.   
Though the result of the arbitration was against her, Kubiak filed a motion with 
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the District Court seeking an order enforcing the Court’s May 16, 2014 order, in 
particular relying on the language in the order referring to a high-low agreement.  In her 
motion, Kubiak claimed that she was entitled to $50,000 because that was the “low” 
amount on which the parties had agreed at the mediation prior to the arbitration.  Id. at 
52-58.  On July 5, 2016, the Court granted the motion without holding an evidentiary 
hearing as it held that the arbitration agreement was enforceable as a high-low agreement 
notwithstanding the arbitrator’s negative liability determination.  The Court also held that 
the high-low parameters were $1 million and $50,000 and thus defendants were liable to 
Kubiak for $50,000.  Id. at 5-8. 
In its opinion, the District Court stated that defendants never moved to “modify or 
alter the terms of the [May 16, 2014] Order of the Court setting forth the terms of the 
arbitration with a high-low agreement.”  Id. at 6.  In these circumstances, the Court 
concluded that defendants had “waived the right to . . . argue” that the terms of the 
agreement into which the Court believed that they had entered had changed.  Id.  The 
Court then concluded that its May 16, 2014 order was enforceable as a high-low 
agreement.  Id. at 7. 
In addressing the high-low agreement’s terms, the District Court explained that 
Kubiak’s position was that the high-low parameters were $50,000 on the low end and $1 
million on the high end.  Id. at 7-8.  But Kubiak does not point to any place in the record 
at which defendants whether orally or in writing explicitly agreed to $1 million/$50,000 
high-low arbitration parameters.  Moreover, the Court, well aware of the June 20, 2014 
letter that defendants had sent to the arbitrator before the arbitration, acknowledged that 
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defendants’ position was that the parties had not agreed to submit the case to the 
arbitrator on a high-low basis because the parties were too far apart in their numbers.  Id. 
at 7. 
But the District Court concluded that defendants’ counsel’s June 20, 2014 letter to 
the arbitrator was not conclusive, even though defendants had sent a copy of that letter to 
Kubiak’s counsel, because Kubiak’s counsel had not signed the copy.  Therefore, the 
Court believed that the letter did not show that the parties had modified what the Court 
was satisfied was their earlier agreement on the terms of a high-low arbitration.  Id.  The 
Court found that “if Defendants sought a different arrangement, Defendants were 
required to Petition the Court to modify” the May 16, 2014 order.  Id.  Thus, the Court 
relied on Kubiak’s specification of the high-low amounts to find that defendants were 
liable to her for $50,000 because it found that $50,000 was the agreed-upon “low” 
amount.  Id. at 7-8. 
 
III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, and 1446.  
In this regard, we point out that Kubiak asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, thus 
advancing a federal issue.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the 
Court’s July 5, 2016 decision constituted a final order.  
We are exercising plenary review over the District Court’s decision regarding the 
enforcement of the parties’ purported high-low arbitration agreement.  See Edwards v. 
HOVENSA, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 357 (3d Cir. 2007).  But we review the Court’s 
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underlying factual findings for clear error.  Id. 
  
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 Defendants argue that the District Court erred in enforcing the purported high-low 
provision of the parties’ agreement to submit the dispute to binding arbitration because 
what they contend was the lack of explicit high-low monetary parameters is a fatal 
omission to its enforcement inasmuch as those terms were “material” to the terms of the 
high-low agreement.  Defendants argue that at most the high-low portion of the order 
summarized an agreement to come to an agreement for high-low arbitration parameters at 
the mediation.  But Kubiak rejects this position and maintains that the Court properly 
found that the parties reached an agreement to include $1 million/$50,000 high-low 
parameters to be applicable at the arbitration. 
Kubiak did not challenge the arbitrator’s finding on liability in the District Court 
nor does she do so here.  Furthermore, she does not claim that the case should not have 
been submitted to arbitration.  Accordingly, the only question before us is whether the 
District Court erred in finding that the parties’ agreement to submit the case to arbitration 
for resolution included a high-low agreement with specific parameters. 
The parties concur that their agreement to arbitrate was a settlement agreement.  
Accordingly, the enforceability of their agreement is dependent on basic contract 
principles.  See AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648, 
106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418 (1986) (“[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be 
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”) 
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(internal quotation marks omitted).  Under Pennsylvania law,3 “[a]s with any contract,” in 
a settlement agreement “the minds of the parties should meet upon all the terms” of the 
contract.  Mazzella v. Koken, 739 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. 1999) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 Defendants point out that “it is axiomatic that in order for a binding contract to 
exist, the parties must have reached an agreement on the material terms.”  Appellants’ br. 
at 25.  They characterize the language in the District Court’s May 16, 2014 order as “a 
record of the parties’ tentative agreement” to proceed with a high-low provision that 
nevertheless lacked “the specific terms in order to give it legal effect.”  Id. at 26.  
Defendants argue that to be enforceable, the high-low provision must have included the 
high-low parameters but the purported agreement is not enforceable because it does not 
reflect that the parties came to a “meeting of the minds” on the parameters of a high-low 
provision.  Id. at 27.  Kubiak rejects this contention and maintains that the Court properly 
determined the scope of the parties’ agreement. 
The only legal authority that the District Court cited for its conclusion that the 
parties agreed to be bound by $1 million/$50,000 high-low parameters, regardless of the 
outcome of the arbitration on liability, was a district court opinion indicating that an 
agreement to submit to binding high-low arbitration is generally a form of settlement 
agreement.  See app’x at 7 n.2.  Here, the Court predicated its enforcement of the 
purported high-low provision on what it believed was defendants’ “waiver” of the 
                                              
3  The parties have relied on Pennsylvania contract law in this case and thus we will as 
well.  See appellants’ reply br. at 12, appellee’s br. at 8, 19. 
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argument that there was not an enforceable agreement because defendants did not file any 
document with the Court indicating that the parties’ understanding of the high-low 
provision had changed after May 16, 2014, when the Court submitted the case to 
arbitration.  Id. at 6-7. 
 The District Court reached its result even though its May 16, 2014 order did not 
include the key material terms of a high-low agreement.  We come to the inescapable 
conclusion that the parties did not agree on the parameters of a high-low agreement by 
the time that the Court issued its May 16, 2014 order because the order specified that “the 
details of the high-low maximum and minimum amounts will be discussed and agreed 
upon at the June 12, 2014 mediation.”  Id. at 29-30.  Therefore, the May 16, 2014 order 
could not have reflected the parties’ “meeting of the minds” on the parameters of a high-
low agreement.   
It is clear that, contrary to what the District Court thought, defendants did not 
“waive” their lack of enforceability argument by not filing any follow-up documentation 
with the District Court after the Court entered its May 16, 2014 order inasmuch as the 
high-low provision in that order did not include its essential terms and the parties merely 
had agreed to proceed to binding arbitration.  We cannot enforce a provision missing 
essential terms and the District Court should not have done so either.  Therefore, the 
Court should not have attempted to enforce the purported high-low provision in its May 
16, 2014 order because there was no agreement to enforce. 
 Notwithstanding our foregoing analysis there is another aspect of this case.  
Kubiak claims that the parties reached an agreement at the June 12, 2014 mediation 
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session for high-low arbitration with $1 million and $50,000 parameters.  On the other 
hand, defendants deny that the parties reached a high-low agreement at that session.  We 
are satisfied that this dispute of fact cannot be resolved on the record that was before the 
District Court and now is before us.  In this regard we point out that we have held in the 
context of settlement enforcement that “[w]hen relief from a judgment hinges upon a 
factual issue and credibility determinations are involved, a hearing should be held to 
determine entitlement to relief.”  Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Garabedian v. Allstates Eng’g Co., Div. of Allstates Design & Dev. Co., 811 
F.2d 802, 803 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Accordingly, the 
District Court should hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the question of whether the 
parties reached an enforceable high-low agreement at the mediation session.  Therefore, 
we will remand the case to the District Court to hold that hearing and if it concludes that 
the parties reached an agreement with respect to the parameters of a high-low agreement 
at the mediation session to determine the agreed upon parameters of a high-low 
agreement and, if they agreed on such parameters, whether Kubiak is entitled to the low 
end recovery even though the arbitrator found that defendants were not liable. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s July 5, 2016 order 
granting plaintiff’s motion to enforce a purported high-low provision in the parties’ 
stipulated agreement to arbitrate and will remand this case to the District Court to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing for the purposes we set forth above.  
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